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1.  Introduction 
When certain entities are introduced into a discourse by a clause (or sequence of clauses), 
they  are accessible to  immediate subsequent reference with  demonstrative pronouns, but 
comparatively inaccessible to reference with the personal pronoun it, as noted by Webber 
(1988, 1991), among others.' 
For example, when  the first sentence in  (la) introduces the situation of there being a 
snake on the speaker's  desk, the demonstrative pronoun  that in  the second sentence can 
refer to this situation; and with this second mention  of  the situation, the pronoun  it in the 
third sentence can also refer to this situation. But in (lb), the personal pronoun it cannot be 
felicitously used for immediate subsequent reference to the situation introduced by the first 
sentence; it is more naturally interpreted as referring to the snake itself. 
(1)  a.  There was a snake on my desk. That scared me. It scared my office-mate 
too. 
b.  There  was  a  snake on  my  desk. It  scared  me.  [it  = the  snake,  not  the 
situation] 
In  (2), an  act introduced  into the discourse is subject to immediate subsequent reference 
using that, but it is more naturally interpreted as referring to the leaf collection, not the act 
of destroying it. 
(2)  A:  Max destroyed his leaf collection last night. 
B:  That was dumb.  [that can refer to the act of destroying the leaf collection] 
It was dumb.  [it = the leaf collection, not the act 
of destroying it] 
In  (3), the same referential  behavior  is exhibited  by  the fact,  introduced  in  the opening 
quote, that Mr. Montanarelli and his associates believe Ms. Lewinsky, and the court does 
not. 
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I  Our examplcs here will be from English, although similar restrictions on pronominal reference to clausally 
introduced entities can be found in other languages. 
ZAS Papers in Linguistics 23, 2001, 111  -127 Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
(3)  a.  "We believe her, the court does not, and that resolves the matter," Mr. 
Montanarelli said today of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that she had an 
independent recollection of the date. (New York Times, May 24,2000) 
a'.  "We  believe  her,  the  court  does  not,  and  it  resolves  the  matter,"  Mr. 
Montanarelli  said  today  of  Ms.  Lewinsky's  testimony  that  she  had  an 
independent  . . . 
The same can be observed for a proposition in (4), and a complex situation in (5), 
(4)  . . . University  of  Michigan  psychologists  David  Lykken  and  Auke  Tellegan  ... 
speculated in  their analysis of  twin  studies that "trying  to be happier  [may be] as 
futile as trying to be  taller and therefore  is counterproductive."  ... Do we really 
believe that  Romanian  orphan babies  left  alone  in their beds  will  have the same 
potential for happiness as those raised by  caring parents of  ample means? That is 
precisely what quotes such as those above will be taken to imply. 
(Cook-Deegan, Robert. 2001. Hype and hope. American Scientist 89.1:62-64.) 
#It is precisely what quotes such as those above will be taken to imply. 
(5)  "The fact that you can get a sheep or a mouse that looks normal," said Stuart 
Newman, a developmental biologist at New York Medical College, "doesn't  mean 
that some subtle things haven't  gone wrong in brain development that you wouldn't 
necessarily notice in  a sheep, but you  would  in a human  ... Cloned humans might 
show higher rates  of  cancer or other diseases, but  we'd  only find out by  cloning 
them and waiting to see if disaster strikes. 
None of this means, however, that cloning services won't someday be marketed 
to desperate people-or  even that human cloning isn't  going on right now. (Talbot, 
Margaret. February 4, 2001. New York Times Magazine, Section 6,  p.45.) 
# None of it means, however, . . . 
In  (6), that  refers  to  the  proposition  or  statement  that  the poodle  is  one  of  the  most 
intelligent dogs around. The pronoun it would have been infelicitous here.2 
(6)  A:  I read somewhere that the poodle is one of the most intelligent dogs around. 
B:  well  uhm..I  definitely  wouldn't  dispute  that.  (Switchboard  Corpus,  Dialog 
20 19) 
B':  ??well uhm..I definitely wouldn't dispute it. 
This paper will examine the role of various factors in affecting the salience, and hence the 
accessibility to pronominal reference, of entities introduced into a discourse by a full clause. 
We begin with the premise that the possibility of  pronominal reference with  it versus that 
depends  on  the  cognitive  status  of  the  referent,  in  the  sense  of  Gundel,  Hedberg  and 
In  (6B), stress can fall on the demonstrative pronoun, or elsewhere in the utterance. In (6BS),  in contrast, 
the  personal pronoun  it cannot bear stress.  The point  here  is  that  (6B')  is  infelicitous  with  any stress 
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Zacharski (1993). This formulation of the problem provides grounds for an explanation of 
the data presented above, and provides a framework within which we examine the role of 
various other factors in promoting the salience of  a clausally introduced entity, including 
the  information  structure of  the utterance  in  which  the entity is introduced.  For entities 
introduced by clausal complements to bridge verbs, we show that the information structure 
of  the utterance introducing the entity has a partial, or one-sided, effect on the salience of 
the entity. When the complement clause is focal, the salience of the entity depends only on 
its  referential  givenness-newness  (in  the  sense of  Gundel  1988,  1999b),  as  we  would 
expect. But  when  the  complement clause  is  ground  material,  the salience  of  an  entity 
introduced  by  the clause is enhanced.  Other factors, including the presuppositionality  of 
factive  and  interrogative  complements,  also  serve  to  enhance  the  salience  of  entities 
introduced by complement clauses. 
2.  The Givenness Hierarchy 
The contrasts  noted  in  the  previous  section  can  be  insightfully  formulated in terms  of 
proposals made by Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski  (1993, and earlier work) regarding the 
relationship  between  referring forms and  speaker assumptions  about  the cognitive status 
(memory and attention state) of  a referent on the part of the addressee. 
Gundel,  Hedberg  and  Zacharski  propose  that  determiners  and  pronouns  constrain 
possible interpretations of  nominal  forms by conventionally signaling the cognitive status 
that the intended referent is assumed to have in the mind of the addressee. This helps solve 
a general problem posed by the fact that the descriptive content encoded in  the form of a 
referring expression typically underdetermines the intended referent of the expression on a 
particular  occasion  of  use. For  example, in  (7), the  content words  of  the  phrase  these 
primitive  reptiles do not uniquely determine which primitive reptiles are being referred to, 
but  the  determiner  these  serves  to  restrict  possible  referents  to  ones  that  are  currently 
activated (that is, in working memory) for the addressee. 
(7)  A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that these primitive reptiles are the nearest relatives 
of turtles. (M.S.Y. Lee, The origin of the Turtle Body Plan. Science, v.261, 1993, 
1649). 
Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski identify six different cognitive statuses (under a total linear 
order, as discussed below). The array of  statuses is called the Givenness Hierarchy: 
Figure 1.  The Givenness Hierarchy  (GH)  and associated forms in English 
in  uniquely  type 
focus  >  activated  >  familiar  >  identifiable  >  referential  >  identifiable 
I  it)  { the N)  ( indefinite this N]  [a  N) 
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Statuses on the hierarchy correspond to memory and  attention  states, ranging from most 
restrictive, 'in focus', to least restrictive, 'type identifiable'. The forms serve as processing 
signals which assist the addressee in  restricting possible interpretations. In  (8) below, for 
example, the nominal forms used signal the restrictions on interpretation shown at right.' 
(8)  I couldn't sleep last night 
Form used  Signaled restrictions 
a.  A dog next door kept me awake.  -- (at least) type identifiable 
b. This dog next door kept me awake.  -- (at least) referential: associate a 
representation by the time sentence is 
processed 
c. The  dog next door kept me awake.  -- (at least) uniquely identifiable: associate a 
unique representation by time NP is 
processed 
d. That dog next door kept me awake.  -- (at least) familiar: in memory 
e.  This dog/that/this kept me awake.  -- (at least) activated: in working memory 
f. It kept me awake.  -- in-focus: center of attention 
The statuses  are  in  a  unidirectional  entailment  relation.  If  something is  in  focus,  it  is 
necessarily activated; if  it is activated, it is necessarily familiar; and so on. The theory thus 
correctly predicts that a given cognitive status can be appropriately coded by a form which 
explicitly signals that status, but also, in general, by forms whose meanings are entailed by 
that status. In (9), for example, the phrase these systetns explicitly signals that the referent is 
activated,  since  this  is  part  of  the  meaning  of  the  proximal  demonstrative determiner 
thislthese in English. 
(9)  These incredibly small magnetic bubbles are the vanguard of a new generation of 
ultradense memory storage systems. These systems are extremely rugged.. . 
[Gordon Graff. Better bubbles. Popular Science 232(2):68 (1988)l 
The determiner these in  these systems  is appropriate since the intended referent was just 
introduced in the preceding sentence and therefore could be expected to be activated for the 
addressee. But since anything activated is also familiar, uniquely  identifiable, referential 
and type identifiable, other forms would have been appropriate here as well, including those 
systems, which requires familiarity, the systems, which  requires the ability to  associate a 
3  As  a  practical  matter  for the  linguistic  theorist  seeking to  discover  the  form-status correlations  for  a 
language, it is essential to determine the cognitive status of an entity on a particular occasion of reference 
independently of the linguistic form used by the speaker or writer on that occasion. This can be done by 
examining prior mention  of the entity  in the discourse, the environmental salience of the entity on thc 
occasion of reference, the descriptive content of the nominal form used on the occasion of reference, and 
other clues to the cognitive status assumed for the entity  by  the speaker (or writer) on the part of  the 
addressce. Information Structure and The Accessibility of Clausally Introduced Referents 
unique  representation,  or  ultradense  memory  storage  systems,  which  requires  only  the 
ability to identify the type. 
The use of  less restrictive forms has limits, however. The indefinite article is rarely used if 
the status is higher than referential, and typically implicates non-familiarity.  Most in-focus 
referents are not coded with demonstratives, even though they could be; and demonstratives 
often implicate a focus shift. Such facts follow from interaction of the Givenness Hierarchy 
with general pragmatic principles involved in language production and understanding (see 
Grice 1975, Sperber and Wilson  1986195). The implicational nature of the GH gives rise to 
'scalar implicatures', in the sense of Horn (1972), which further restrict the distribution and 
interpretation of referring forms (see Gundel, et al 1993, Gundel and Mulkern 1998). 
With  this background, Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski propose  that  the possibility of 
reference with personal pronouns versus demonstratives depends on the cognitive status of 
the  referent.  While  both  types  of  pronouns  restrict  possible  referents  to  those  that  are 
activated ( in working memory), personal pronouns also require the more restrictive status 
in focus, that is, their referents must be the current center of  attention. This is illustrated in 
(10)-(11) below, from Gundel et al (1993). 
(10)  a.  My neighbor's bull mastiff bit a girl on a bike. 
It's the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer. 
b.  Sam found an abandoned dog. It had a broken leg. 
(1 1)  Sears delivered new siding to my new neighbors with the bull mastiff. 
#It's  the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer. 
That's the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer. 
In (lo), an entity introduced prominently in the first sentence is rendered in focus, and then 
referred  to  by  a  personal  pronoun  in  the  second.  In  (ll), an  entity  introduced  more 
peripherally in the first sentence is made activated, but not in-focus, and can be referred to 
more felicitously by a demonstrative than a personal pronoun in the second. 
This permits an explanation of the facts in section  1 in terms of the Givenness Hierarchy. 
For  example,  in  (2), at  the  conclusion  of  A's  utterance,  the  act  of  destroying the  leaf 
collection can  be  assumed  to be activated, since it was just  introduced in  the preceding 
sentence, but not in focus; the focus of  attention after the utterance is processed is on the 
referents  of  the  major  arguments  in  (2A),  specifically,  John  and  the  leaf  collection. 
Similarly, in (5), the complex situation consisting of potential drawbacks to human cloning 
is rendered activated by  the first paragraph, but  we can assume that  it is not rendered in 
focus given the higher salience conferred by this passage on cloned humans, rates of cancer, 
and  other  referents of  main  clause  arguments. Accounts of  other examples in  section  1 
proceed along similar lines. 
In  the following section, we examine factors that contribute to bringing an entity into 
focus,  including  the  role  that  information  structure  plays  in  determining  the  cognitive 
statuses of referents introduced by clauses and thus the nominal forms which can be used to 
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3.  What brings an entity into focus of attention? 
3.1.  Syntactic structure 
The framework outlined  above makes  predictions  about  the  appropriateness  of  different 
pronominal forms depending on whether or not the intended referent can be assumed to be 
in focus for the addressee. Although the theory itself does not predict what brings an entity 
into focus, Gundel et al (1993:279) suggest that "the entities in focus at a given point in the 
discourse will be that partially-ordered subset of  activated entities which  are likely to be 
continued as topics of  subsequent utterances."  Membership in this set is partly, though not 
wholly,  determined  by  syntactic  structure.  For example,  subjects  and  direct  objects  of 
matrix sentences are more likely to bring an entity into focus than elements in  subordinate 
clauses and prepositional phrases. For similar reasons, the focus of attention at the end of an 
utterance is more likely to be on the thematic arguments of the verb of  a clause within the 
utterance (including the main clause), than on the proposition, fact, or situation expressed 
by that clause  (cf. the Centering Algorithms of Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein  1983, 1995). 
A fact or proposition  introduced by an NP within  a clause is  thus  more  likely to be 
brought  into focus than  one which  is introduced  by  the whole clause. Compare (12) and 
(13) with the examples in (3) and (4) above, for example. 
(12)  a.  At that moment, Maria brought up another fact. It sent shivers down my 
spine. 
b.  Alex then introduced a new proposition. But it was immediately pooh- 
poohed. 
(13)  Last November, Bailey and Daniel Halperin of the University of California 
San Francisco wrote an article for The Lancet in which they pointed to evidence 
that circumcision protects against HIV, and accused public health agencies of 
disregarding it. [New Scientist, July 8, 2000: 181 
A possible reason for why nominal forms are more likely to bring an entity into focus is 
that  they  are not  higher  order expressions.  The difference  in  semantic type determines 
different  referential  behavior, possibly  correlated with  different criteria of  individuation. 
Hegarty  (2001)  discusses  this  connection,  proposing  that  the  denotation  domains  of 
nominal  expressions  such  as  those  in  (12)  are  unordered  sets,  and  that  elements  of 
unordered sets are conceptualized as fully individuated, discrete objects, akin to concrete 
objects.  Like  concrete  objects,  they  can  be  rendered  immediately  in  focus  upon  their 
introduction into a discourse, depending, as in (10)-(1 I), on whether they are introduced in 
a sufficiently central syntactic position within the introducing sentence. 
3.2.  Less overt factors 
Conditions which appear to boost the salience of entities also include less overt factors such 
as presuppositions  and prior beliefs, and even inquisitive looks, all of which can cause an Information Structure and The Accessibility of Clausally Introduced Referents 
entity to be "reprocessed",  and thus brought into focus, even when it is overtly mentioned 
only once (see Borthen et al  1997 and Gundel et a1  1999). 
In  (14), a baseline case for comparison, the speaker, upon clausally introducing the fact 
that  linguists  earn  less  than  computer  scientists,  can  assume that  this  fact  is  rendered 
activated, but  not  in-focus, for the hearer, leading to a preference for that over  it  in  the 
follow-up reference to this fact. 
(14)  a.  1  hear linguists earn less than computer scientists, and that's terrible. 
b.  ??I  hear linguists earn less than computer scientists, and it's terrible. 
In  (15), in  contrast, the follow-up reference is made by  another speaker, which results in 
somewhat more complicated inferences regarding the cognitive status of the fact at issue. 
(15)  Speaker A:  I just read that linguists earn less than computer scientists. 
Speaker B:  (i.)  That's terrible!  (ii.)  It's terrible! 
At the completion of A's utterance, B can assume that the fact that linguists earn less than 
computer scientists is at least activated for A. In response B(i), B signals the assumption 
that  this  fact  has  been  activated,  but  possibly  not  brought  into  focus by  A's  utterance, 
thereby  inviting  A  to  infer  that  the fact  is  news  to  B. In  response  B(ii), B  signals the 
assumption that the fact is in focus for A, or ought to be, consistent with it being accepted 
background  information for discourse in  the relevant  social circle; this  invites A to  infer 
that B already knew the fact. 
In (16) below, the proposition that B has a dental appointment is clausally introduced by 
A's  utterance. This, by itself, suffices to activate the proposition, but  not to bring it into 
focus, accounting for why the response (l6)B' sounds unnatural. 
(16)  A:  You have a dental appointment at noon. 
B:  That's true.  B':  ??It's true.  B":  It's true, then. 
But  (16)B"  is  noticeably  more  acceptable  than  (16)B'.  Following Gundel, Borthen  and 
Fretheim (1999), we suggest an explanation of  this fact, drawing on a relevance-theoretic 
approach to the pragmatics of language understanding (Sperber and Wilson  1986195).  then 
in B"  functions as an interpretive particle which conveys the meaning that the content of the 
sentence it is appended to follows by way of  inference from something the addressee just 
said. The response by  B  in  (16)B"  means essentially, "Given  A's  assertion that I have a 
dental appointment at noon, then I can take it as confirmed that I have a dental appointment 
at noon." The only way B's utterance can yield contextual effects for A is if A's utterance 
confirmed the truth of  a proposition that  B had been questioning, and B knows that A is 
aware of this. Thus, the fact that B had a dental appointment at 3 was not activated for the 
first time by A; rather, A's  utterance brought  into focus a fact that was already mutually 
manifest to both A and B beforehand, thereby licensing the use of it in B". 
Salience can also be boosted non-linguistically. For example, the exchange in (17) below 
is fully natural if A gives B a skeptical look during the indicated pause. Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
(17)  A:  Why didn't you come to the rehearsal yesterday? 
B:  I thought I told you. I had to help Peter move. (Pause) It's true! 
The skeptical  look communicates A's skepticism  about the truth  of  the proposition just 
expressed  by  B,  thus  causing  the  proposition  that  B  has  to  help  Peter  move  to be 
reprocessed  (by  both  A  and  B)  and  assuring  that  it  is  mutually  in  focus,  making  it 
accessible to reference with it. 
Salience of an entity in the environment also suffices for pronominal reference with it. If 
A and B are in a room together with a baby who suddenly begins to walk, A can produce 
the utterance in (IS), or, if A sees B watching the baby walk, the utterance in (19). 
(18)  Will you look at that! The baby's walking. (Jackendoff 2001) 
(19)  Isn't it great?  [it = the fact that the baby is walking] 
3.3. The referential behavior of different types of clausally introduced referents 
Another factor which  seems to  have an effect on  whether or  not  a clausally  introduced 
entity  is  brought  into  focus  is  the  degree  of  world  immanence  of  the  entity  and, 
correlatively, its manner and degree of individuation. Asher (1993) suggests that there is a 
spectrum of world immanence. Events and states, which have causal, spatial and temporal 
properties, have high world immanence:  "purely abstract objects"  such as propositions and 
thoughts have very low world immanence, and their individuation principles depend more 
on the means we use to describe them than  on  independent properties  of  objects  in  the 
world. Facts and situations are somewhere in between. Interestingly, this distinction appears 
to correlate with the accessibility to reference with it versus this or that when the entities in 
question are introduced by clausal constituents. Events, whose individuation properties are 
largely  independent  of  the  means  we  use  to  describe  them,  have  referential  properties 
similar to those of concrete objects and other referents denoted by nominal constituents of 
clauses, as seen in  (20), where either it or a demonstrative this/that can refer to the event 
described in the first clause. 
(20)  a.  John broke a priceless vase. That happened at noon.  [that = the event] 
b.  John broke a priceless vase.  It happened at noon. [it = the event] 
Such facts are explained if  we assume that the individuating properties that events share 
with  referents of  nominal constituents make it more likely that they will be brought into 
focus immediately subsequent to  their  introduction  with  a full clause. The addressee,  in 
processing the first sentence in (20), posits a relation  'break'  between John and a vase, and 
this  relation  involves  an  event  of  John  breaking  the  vase.  In  the  terms  of  Discourse 
Representation  Theory,  with  an  underlying  event  semantics  for  active  verbs,  the 
introduction of  break'(u,  v,  e),  into a DRS, for discourse entities u, v  satisfying John@) 
and vase(v), requires a discourse entity e for the event in which John broke the vase. 
' Since tl~at  merely requires activation of its referent, and anything in focus is also activated, in focus entities 
can be referenced with either that or it. 
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Situations are somewhat less accessible to reference with it, as seen in (21). 
(21)  a.  John broke a priceless vase. Thatlthis was intolerable to the embassy. 
b.  John broke a priceless vase. ??It was intolerable to the embassy. 
The predicate  intolerable in  (21) precludes  an interpretation on  which the demonstrative 
pronoun refers to the event of John breaking the vase, since an event is unchangeable once 
it has occurred, and thus cannot fail to be tolerated. The situation of John breaking the vase, 
in  contrast, includes  its  ramifications,  and those at least,  are subject to amelioration  or 
change, making it sensible to say that the situation is intolerable to the embassy, which will 
therefore require  a change in the situation  (realized as a change in the consequences or 
ramifications)  without any change in  the associated event in  which  the vase was broken. 
The inclusion, or potential inclusion, of ramifications as part of  a situation, but not as part 
of  an  event, is  plausibly what  makes  a situation not  clearly delimited  in  spatiotemporal 
extent, and therefore less fully or clearly individuated upon introduction than an event. 
Thus, situations,  which  are  less world  immanent than  events, and less susceptible to 
individuation by  spatiotemporal extent, are also less likely to be brought into focus upon 
first introduction with a full clause. The examples in (1) and (5) bear this out.  Example (3) 
shows  that  facts  pattern  with  situations,  and  not  with  events,  in  their  availability  for 
subsequent  pronominal  reference.  Finally,  as  examples  (4)  and  (6)  show,  clausally 
introduced propositions, which  lie at the low end of  the world  immanence spectrum, are 
typically  not  available  for  subsequent  pronominal  reference  with  it.  The  proposition 
expressed by  an  utterance  is  activated by that utterance but  is typically  not brought  into 
focus. 
In  order for an utterance to bring some entity into focus it  is  necessary, (though not 
sufficient) that the entity be directly expressed as part of  the propositional content of the 
utterance. This explains, at least partly, the contrast between events on the one hand, and 
situations, facts and  propositions  on  the  other.  Speech  acts  (i.e.  acts  performed  by  an 
utterance, which are not part of the propositional content) are thus never brought into focus, 
and consequently inaccessible to subsequent reference with  'it'.  This is illustrated in (22) 
and  (23). 
(22)  Thorne:  So  you fired her? 
Eric:  We're going to do a lot more than just fire her, Thorne. 
Thorne:  What does that mean?  (from the TV soap opera "The Bold and the 
Beautiful") 
#What does it mean? 
(23)  A.  John snores. 
B.  That's rude. 
B'.  It's rude. 
In (22), the demonstrative that is interpreted as referring to Eric's statement 'We're going to 
do more than just fire her'. This interpretation is impossible if  that is replaced with it, and Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
the  resulting  sentence  is  thus  unacceptable  in  this  context.  In  (23),  the  demonstrative 
pronoun that in (B) is ambiguous between an interpretation where it refers to the act of John 
snoring and an interpretation where it refers to A's illocutionary act of  informing B of this 
fact. By contrast , (23B') can only have the former interpretation. 
4.  The role of information structure 
The cognitive status, and therefore the accessibility to pronominal reference, of a clausally 
introduced entity is partly constrained by the information structure of the utterance in which 
it is introduced into a disc ours^.^ In  particular, information structure yields some striking 
effects, but  also a surprising asymmetry, when higher  order entities are introduced by (or 
within) clausal complements. 
Entities introduced by clausal complements to bridge verbs, such as think, believe, and 
say, exhibit  the  familiar pattern  of  being  rendered  activated,  but  not  in-focus,  through 
mention by  a clause. This is shown by the naturally occurring example in  (24) below, as 
well as by the constructed data in (25), tested on a small survey of English speakers6 
(24)  Ising reportedly believed that his negative results would hold in higher dimensions 
as well. 
In this conjecture he was wrong.  (American Scientist 88:385) 
In this/ #it, he was wrong. 
(25)  A:  Alex believes [F that the company destroyed the FILE]. 
B:  That's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge 
B':  #It's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
When (25A) is used with the focus-structure shown, to introduce the proposition  that the 
company destroyed the file, the response by B using that is much more felicitous than the 
response with it. However, it and that are equally good when the complement clause is in 
the ground (theme; topic) of A's utterance, as in (26A). 
(26)  A:  Alex  INSISTSEiELIEVES] that the company destroyed the file. 
B:  But that'slit's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
5  By information structure, we mean a bifurcation of material in an utterance into what has been called focus 
versus ground, comment versus  topic, or rheme versus theme. This notion  is  not  to be  identified  with 
contrastive focus or with  the more general distinction between  new versus old information. Information 
structural focus is  also distinct from the  cognitive status  'in  focus'.  See Vallduvi (1990)  and  Gundel 
(1999a)  for more detailed discussion of related terminological  and  conceptual issues. We will  indicate 
information structural focus by the subscript 'F'. 
6  The use of it in (24) would be just as infelicitous if the PP were not preposed. Thus, the infelicity of it in 
(24) cannot be attributed to its incompatibility with the secondary focal stress it bears in this position. Information Structure and The Accessibility of Clausally Introduced Referents 
Since an entity associated with the ground (theme; topic) is already at least familiar to the 
addressee  prior  to  the  utterance  (see  Gundel  1988  inter  alia),  its  mention  within  the 
utterance  suffices to  bring it into the focus of  attention, if  it  does not  already have that 
status. 
In  (24)-(26), relational  givenness/newness  and  referential  givenness/newness  (in  the 
sense of  Gundel  1988, 1999a,b) are coextensive. For example, the information structural 
focus in (25)  represents a proposition that is not only new in relation to the topic (what Alex 
believes), but also referentially new to the hearer; and the clausal complement in the ground 
of  (26) expresses a proposition  which  is not  only given  in  relation  to  the informational 
structural focus, but also referentially  given in  the sense of  being already at least familiar 
and probably  also activated. But material  in  the informational  focus doesn't  have to be 
referentially new (see Gundel 1980, 1999a,b, Vallduvi 1990, Lambrecht 1994). So  when we 
have a bridge verb  complement which is an  information structural  focus, but  is already 
activated  in  the  discourse,  which  factor  wins  out?  Is  an  entity  expressed  by  such  a 
complement  rendered  in  focus  or  does  it  remain  merely  activated?  Is  it  accessible  to 
reference with it, or only with that?  Consider (27B2). 
(27)  Al:  I believe that the company destroyed the file, but not everybody does. 
B 1:  What does Alex believe? 
A2:  Alex believes [F that the company destroyed the file]. 
B2:  But it'slthat's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
(27B2) suggests that it is referential  givenness (i.e. cognitive status of a discourse entity), 
and  not  relational  givenness  (i.e.  topic-focus  structure),  that  determines  whether  the 
complement of a bridge verb will be brought into focus. 
But now flip the problem around. Content in the topiclground of an utterance does not 
always have a high  degree  of  referential givenness. It's cognitive  status may be merely 
familiar, but not necessarily activated.  So when we have a bridge verb complement which 
is ground material, but new to the discourse, which factor wins out? Is an entity introduced 
by such a complement rendered  in-focus, because it is in the ground, or merely activated, 
because it is new to the discourse? Is it  accessible to reference with it, or only with  that? 
Consider (28) [secondary stress on murdered]: 
(28)  a.  Alex is hopeless. 
b.  He [F INSISTS] that Tom was murdered, for example, 
c.  -- even though there's not a shred of evidence for that. 
-- even though there's not a shred of evidence for it. 
Use of  it is as felicitous  as that in  (28c). The information  structure of  (28b) forces the 
addressee to accept the content of the complement clause as already familiar, so that (2%) 
renders  it  in  focus,  making  it  available  to  reference  using  it.  Thus,  presentation  of  a 
clausally introduced entity in the ground of an utterance is another way to promote salience, 
and bring the entity into focus, even if it is, in fact, new to the discourse. Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
With bridge verb complements, we thus appear to have an asymmetric situation: bifurcation 
into focuslground has no effect on the cognitive status of  an  entity introduced within the 
information structural focus.7 But it can have an effect when an entity is mentioned (even 
introduced) within ground material, because mention  within the ground necessarily signals 
a higher cognitive status for the entity. This conclusion is preliminary, however, in that the 
judgments are subtle, and naturally occurring data that would bear directly on the issue is 
sparse. 
5.  Lexical structure versus information structure 
When  the  bridge  verb  in  (25)-(28)  is  replaced  with  a factive  verb,  demonstrative and 
personal  pronouns can both  be used to  immediately refer  to  the entity expressed  by the 
complement clause, regardless of  the information structure of  A's  utterance. (Constructed 
data surveyed on a sample of English speakers.) 
(29)  A.  Alex verified that the company destroyed the file. 
B.  That's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
B'.  It's false; the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
Thus, the contrast in (25) between subsequent reference with it versus that is not exhibited 
in (29), and the contrast between  (25) and (26), exhibiting a partial effect of  information 
structure on  cognitive status, is  also  absent.  The lexical  semantics  of  the  factive verb 
enforces  the  condition  that  the  entity  expressed  by  the  complement  clause  be  already 
familiar (or at least capable of being accommodated as familiar) to the addressee, so that its 
further mention in A's utterance renders this entity in focus. 
In  order to understand this fully, it is useful to note that this pattern  is not confined to 
complements of factive verbs. It is also obtained in complements to certain non-factive (and 
non-bridge) verbs, including agree, emphasize, deny, and doubt, and in complements to the 
non-factive adjectival predicate be certain.' 
(30)  a.  Alex and Susan agree that the company destroyed the file. 
I'm surprised that they believe it. 
b.  Alex and Susan agree that the company destroyed the file. 
I'm surprised that they believe that. 
(31)  A:  Alex is certain that the company destroyed the file. 
B:  That's false: the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
B':  It's false: the file has been submitted to the district judge. 
'  Gundel (1999a) makes a similar observation, concluding that mention  within  the information  structural 
focus (her 'semantic focus')  doesn't  necessarily bring an entity into focus of attention. 
8  Cattell  (1978)  noticed  that  these  non-factives  pattern  with  factives  in  wh-extraction  from  their 
complements. See also Melvold (1991), Hegarty (1992), and Schulz (1999) for discussion of this class of 
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As with factive predicates, the pattern  in (30)-(31) is one in which it is at least as felicitous 
as that in referring to the content of the complement clause, and, in some cases, more so. 
The predicates  in  (30)-(31) are not  factive  (in the sense made clear by  Kiparsky  and 
Kiparsky 197  1) since they don't commit the speaker of the ascription in which they occur to 
the truth  of their complement clauses. However, they share with factives a slightly more 
subtle  semantic  property:  they  are  felicitous  when  the  proposition,  fact,  or  situation 
expressed by  the  complement clause is  not  an  entirely new  entity, but  rather,  an  entity 
already accepted  as given  or familiar  in  the discourse.  The ascriptions  with  agree and 
certain  in  (30)-(31),  as  well  as  the  factive  ascription  in  (29), would  be  odd if  used  to 
introduce  into the discourse the fact or proposition  that  the company destroyed the file. 
Using  a  situation  variable  in  the  semantics,  in  the context of  Discourse Representation 
Theory (Kamp and Ryle  1993), the interpretation of the factive ascription in  (29) can be 
expressed by  the Discourse Representation  Structure  (DRS) shown  in  (32) below.'  The 
ascriptions with agree and certain in (30)-(31), though  non-factive, would have identical 
DRS's, with trivial substitution of the verb denotations. 
In  contrast, a belief  ascription such as that  in (25A), using a bridge verb,  is interpreted 
semantically  as  just  a  relation  between  Alex  and  the  proposition  expressed  by  the 
complement clause. A DRS for (25A) is presented in (33). 
%, 
u, v, Z, S 
Alex (u) 
Company (v) 
File (z) 
destroy (v, z, s) (wo) 
verify (u, hw[ destroy (v, z, s)(w) I) 
Of  course, the ascription made by A in  (25) could express a proposition which is already 
familiar to the hearer. The property distinguishing bridge verbs from the factive and other 
predicates discussed here is not that  the content of the bridge verb complement must be 
\, 
9  Subordinate DRSs are abbreviated as formulas here to save space. For semantic representations using a 
situation variable, see Ginzburg (199Sab), and, for similar structures with an event variable, Higginbotham 
(1985,  1989). Schultz (1999) presents a proposal  very  similar  in  spirit to that  represented  in  (32), but 
implemented quite differently in the context of Heim's (1982) File Card Semantics. 
u, V,  2,  S 
Alex (u) 
Company (v) 
File (z) 
believe (u, hw[ 3s[destroy (v, z, s)(w)] I) Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
unfamiliar, but only that  it can be. Bridge verbs, unlike other predicates discussed here, do 
not assume the familiarity of the content of the complement. 
Interrogatives  pattern  with  factive  complements  with  regard  to  the  status  of  abstract 
entities mentioned by or within them. Naturally occurring data are shown in (34) and (39'' 
(34)  One common attribute of a scientist is an unusually acute sense of numbers and their 
implications. I think it was Bertrand Russell who once observed that mankind would 
rather  commit  suicide  than  learn  arithmetic.  In  other  words,  the  meaning  and 
implications of  some numbers  are often  lost on  most people - even  when  those 
numbers bring  a  very  important  message.  George Bernard  Shaw stated  that  one 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  an  educated  person  is  that  he  or  she  can  be 
emotionally moved by statistics. 
A sense of  numbers -  why do I dwell on this observation? Perhaps it's because 
we who come from a background of  engineering, mathematics and science tend to 
convey  concepts  and  findings  in  terms  of  numbers;  yet  many  for  whom  our 
messages  are  intended  find  our  communications  (full  of  numbers  as  they  are) 
unappetizing,  boring,  unconvincing  and  a  bit  standoffish.  (American  Scientist 
88:378) 
(35)  Where and for how  long  saguaro,  cardon,  and organ  pipe  lived  together  before 
moving into the Sonoran Desert is currently unknown. Thus, we do not know where 
these species evolved the phenological differences that reduce their joint reliance for 
pollination on a single species of nectar-feeding bat. 
One hint about this, however, comes from geographic variation in the timing of 
peak flowering in organ pipe. [This can be felicitously replaced with it here, without 
affecting interpretation:] 
One hint  about it, however, comes from geographic variation  in  the timing of 
peak flowering in organ pipe. [it = where these species evolved the differences that 
reduce their joint reliance for pollination on a single species of nectar-feedingbat.] 
Constructed data has been  tested on  a small survey of English  speakers, with the results 
shown in (36)-(37). 
(36)  A:  Alex wonders whether the company destroyed the file. 
B: It's not likely. The file contained no incriminating information. 
B: That's not likely. The file contained no incriminating information. 
[itlthat = that the company destroyed the file] 
(37)  a.  Alex wonders who destroyed the file; it has impeded the investigation. 
b.  Alex wonders who destroyed the file; that has impeded the investigation. 
[ittthat = that someone destroyed the file] 
'O  Also, note  that  the  first  paragraph  of  (35) could  felicitously  be  followed  by  it  is  a  nzj'sten,,  with  it 
interpreted as specified at the end of the example. 
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The possibility  of  immediate subsequent  reference  with  a personal  pronoun  in  (36)-(37) 
follows  from  the  presuppositional  nature  of  questions.  To  simplify,  within  DRT,  the 
wonder-ascription  in (36A) should be represented with a DRS of the form shown in (38), 
where  cp  is an  appropriate  relation  between  Alex  and the proposition p specified  on  the 
penultimate line of the DRS." 
(38) 
Interpreted as in (38), the wonder-ascription in (36A) is a question about the proposition 
that the company destroyed the file. This should be the form of any semantic account of the 
wonder-ascription  which captures the presuppositionality  of  the embedded question: the 
proposition that the company destroyed the file must be an established discourse entity prior 
to the utterance of  (36A), or it must be accommodated in  the sense of  Heim (1982).  The 
assertive  content of  (36A)  should be captured  in  the  last  line  of  the  DRS,  cp.  On  one 
realization of 9,  given in Hegarty (2001), (36A) asserts that Alex is in the state of wonder 
with respect to the proposition that p holds of the actual world, w,. 
The embedded interrogative in (37) is also presuppositional: it pertains to the property 
that holds (across worlds) of those who destroyed the file, and asserts of  it that Alex  is in 
the relation of  wonder to this property instantiated on the actual world. The property must 
be  either established prior to the utterance of  (37), or accommodated on the occasion of 
utterance. A DRS expressing the semantic interpretation of the wonder-ascription  in (37) 
should therefore have the form shown in (39). 
.  . 
- 
u, v, z,  s, p 
Alex (u) 
Company (v) 
File (z) 
P(w) = hwhu3s[destroy (x,  z, s)(w)] 
cp 
u, v, z,  s, p 
Alex (u) 
Company (v) 
File (z) 
p(w) = hw3s[destroy (v, z, s)(w)] 
cp 
A simple representation of the assertion of the wonder-ascription in (37) is cp = wonder (a, 
P(w0)). 
I  I  To unsimplify, questions are, in fact, constrained not only by the formal semantic condition captured here, 
but  by  rich  contextual conditions on what  would  count as a  suitable answer  to  a question  in  a  given 
context. See Ginzburg  (1995ab)  and  Asher  and  Lascarides  (1998).  The important  point,  for present 
purposes, is that these accounts would incorporate, and add to, the presuppositional condition given here. 
The proposals  sketched here would  therefore be a part  of  an  account given  according  to these  richer 
theories of the interpretation of questions. Michael Hegarty, Jeanette K. Gundel & Kaja Borthen 
The content of p, specified in  the penultimate line of  the DRS in  (38), is thus mentioned 
again within the condition  cp. The penultimate line in (38) thus enforces double processing 
of the proposition that the company destroyed the file, rendering it in-focus at completion of 
the wonder-ascription in (36A). The penultimate line in (39) does the same for the property 
"destroy the file"  at completion of the wonder-ascription in (37). Thus the penultimate line 
expressing the presuppositionality of questions in (38) and (39) is analogous to the effect of 
the penultimate line of the DRS for factive (and similar) ascriptions, in (32) above. 
Thus, the presuppositionality  involved in  the lexical structure of  a factive (or related) 
predicate,  and  the  semantic  presuppositionality  of  embedded  questions,  are  additional 
factors which  can bring an entity into focus. In  these cases, information structure has no 
bearing on the cognitive status of the clausally introduced entity. 
6.  Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  we  addressed  the  fact  that  clausally  introduced  entities,  immediately 
subsequent to their introduction into a discourse, are typically accessible to reference with a 
demonstrative pronoun, but not with the personal pronoun it. We found that this fact can be 
explained on the basis of the observation that such entities are typically activated, but not 
brought into focus, upon their introduction to a discourse. However, clausally introduced 
entities  are,  in  fact,  sometimes  referenced  with  it  immediately  subsequent  to  their 
introduction.  An  examination  of  the  discourse  environments  in  which  this  is  possible 
provides important insights into the various syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic factors that 
can boost the salience of an entity and bring it into focus. 
We've shown that  information structure, in  the sense of a focuslground bifurcation, is 
one such factor when an entity is mentioned with a bridge verb complement, but only in a 
way which  is asymmetric, depending on whether the entity is mentioned  within  focal or 
non-focal material. When the complement is focal, there is no effect: the cognitive status of 
an  entity  expressed  by  a  focal  complement  depends  entirely  on  the  referential 
givennesslnewness (i.e. the cognitive status) of the entity. But when the complement is part 
of the ground (topicltheme), the entity is brought into focus. 
In  factive complements and embedded questions, the lexical nature of  the embedding 
predicate and the semantic nature of the construction require an entity mentioned with the 
subordinate clause to be  treated as referentially  given  independently of  the  information- 
structure of the utterance. 
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Although the linear order of arguments (and adverbials) in German is relatively free, it 
underlies  certain  restrictions;  these  don't  apply  to  the  so-called  unmarked  order for 
arguments (Lenerz 1977) and adverbials (FreyIPittner 1998). It is a common assumption 
to take the unmarked order as basic and derive all other orders from it by scrambling, 
whatever  its  specific  characteristics  may  be  (cf.,  amongst others, HaiderIRosengren 
1998). The observable  restrictions  obtaining  for some linear  ordering  may  then  be 
considered  as constraints  on  a movement operation  (scrambling).  Some well  known 
restrictions are given in  (I), exemplified by the linear order of  indirect (10) and direct 
object (DO). In the examples (2) -  (4), the focussed NP is the questioned argument, e.g. 
Q:IO in (2): 
(1)  a.  [fdef 101 z  [kdef DO] : "unmarked order", regardless of focus position 
(cf. (2a), (3a), (4a)). 
b.  [+def DO] > [IO].G  : scrambling of [+def, -F] is ok (cf. (2b)). 
c.  *[kdef DOIF> I0  =Don't  scramble focus !  (cf. (3)) 
d.  *[-def DO] z  Don't scramble (existential)  indefinites !  (cf. (4)) 
(2)  Wem hast du das Buch gegeben?  Q :  I0 
'Whom did you give the book 1' 
a.  Ich habe [demleinem StuDENten]~  das Iein Buch gegeben. 
[kdef. IO]F  > [kdef. DO] 
I  have  the/  a  student  the /a  book given 
("unmarked order") 
b.  Ich habe das Buch [demleinem StuDENten]~  gegeben 
[+def. DO] > [fdef. IO]F 
I  have  the book  the /  a  student  given 
(scrambled [+def DO,-F] is 0.k.) 
'I gave the book to the student.' 
(3)  Was hast du dem Studenten gegeben?  Q:DO 
'What did you give to the student?' 
a.  Ich habe dem Studenten [das BUCHIF gegeben. 
[+def. 101 > [+def. DOIF 
I  have  the  student  the  book  given  ( "unmarked order") 
b.  *?Ich habe [das BUCHIF  dem Studenten gegeben. 
*[+def. DOIF  > [+def. 10] 
I  have  the  book  the  student  given  (*scrambled focus) 
'I gave the student the book.' 
ZAS Papers in Linguisrics 23, 2001, 129-139 (4)  Wem hast du ein Buch gegeben?  Q : I0 
'Whom did you give a book?' 
a.  Ich habe [demleinem StuDENten]~  ein Buch gegeben 
[kdef. IOIF  > [-def. DO] 
I  have  the/  a  student  a  book  given 
("unmarked order") 
b.  *Ich habe ein Buch [dem StuDENtenIF  gegeben. 
*[-def. DO] > [+def. IOIF 
I  have  a  book  the  student  given 
(*scrambled indefinite NP) 
c.  *Ich habe ein Buch [einem StuDENten]~  gegeben. 
*[-def. DO] > [-def IO]F 
I  have  a  book  a  student  given 
(*scrambled indefinite NP) 
'I gave a book to the student.' 
As the standard examples in  (2)-(4) show, I0  > DO is assumed to be the unmarked 
order for most  verbs  taking  two objects; here,  no  specific  restrictions  apply:  every 
distribution  of  definite or indefinite NP and focus is possible for that  order, cf. (2a), 
(3a), (4a). Scrambling a definite DO to the left of a focussed I0  gives a possible order, 
too, cf. (2b). If, however, the scrambled DO is a focussed NP, it must not be scrambled 
in front of an 10,  cf. (3b). Thus,  (lc) "Don't  scramble focus!" is a crucial restriction on 
scrambling in German. It  may be accounted for by the interaction  of focus placement, 
focus projection and, possibly, the proper assignment of prosodic features (cf., amongst 
others,  Biiring  1997, 2001,  von  Heusinger  1999). Thus, this  restriction  may  find  a 
plausible  functional  explanation ensuring  the proper  interpretation  of  a sentence wrt 
background-focus structure and the formal means for its expression, i.e. linear order and 
prosodic prominence. 
There is, however, an  additional restriction, for which, to my knowledge, so far no 
explanation  has  been  proposed.  As  (4b),  (4c)  show, an  indefinite DO should not  be 
scrambled across an 10,  even if the condition (lc) on focus-scrambling is not violated. 
Examples  (4b), (4c)  suggest  that  scrambling  of  an  indefinite DO is  not  possible  in 
general. As (5a), however, shows, the scrambled DO einen obszonen Witz ('an obscene 
joke') may be scrambled under certain conditions: 
(5)  Wem erziihlt  Peter einen  obszonen  Witz? ,,Whom does Peter tell  an  obscene 
joke?" 
a.  Peter erzahlt einen obszonen Witz  immer einem Schulfreund. (generic) 
Peter tells  an  obscene  joke  always a-DAT schoolmate 
'Peter tells an obscene joke always to a schoolmate.' 
As far as is known, in this case the scrambling must be to a position outside the VP, as 
indicated by the temporal adverbial immer ('always')  which is assumed to indicate the 
left  boundary  of  VP.  In  this  case, the scrambled  DO may  receive  a non-existential, 
generic reading. Thus, the proper constraint on scrambling is assumed to be (Id) "Don't 
scramble  existential  inclefinites!". Generic  indefinites,  however,  may  be  scrambled 
(provided that the sentence itself allows for a generic interpretation). Scrambling and Reference in German 
It  should be  pointed  out, however, that  this  restriction  is still too  weak:  Scrambling 
across a subject (6a) is still not possible, whereas the (generic) subject itself  may be 
scrambled as in (6b). 
(6)  a.  *weil einen obszonen Witz immer  Peter  einem Schulfreund erzahlt, 
since an  obscene  joke  always Peter a-DAT  schoolmate  tells 
b.  weil obszone Witze immer an Herrenabenden erzahlt werden. 
since obscene jokes  always on boy-nights  told  become 
'Since obscene jokes will always be told on boys' nights.' 
Thus, scrambling seems to be  also sensitive to the syntactic hierarchy of  arguments. 
Possibly, the restriction as stated above in  (Id) is also too strong: In  some cases the 
scrambling of  existential  indefinites  seems to me to  be  possible,  as  will  be  shown 
below, cf. (14b). 
In  the  following, I will  try  to  present  the  outlines  of  a possible explanation for the 
restriction (Id), based on a proposal governing the proper referential interpretation  of 
indefinite NPs. 
Before doing so, however, let me point out some crucial shortcomings of some current 
proposals. 
It  has been  assumed that syntactic structure shows a bi-partition parallel to the bi- 
partition  of  a  formula  of  standard  predicate  logic  (cf.  Diesing  1990  and  much 
consecutive discussion). A quantified logical formula like 
(7)  Vx (man (x)) 3y (woman (y) A love (x, y)) (every man loves a woman) 
may be split into a restrictive clause defining the domain of the universal quantifier (Vx 
(man (x))) and the so-called nuclear scope (3y (woman (x) A love (x, y))) containing the 
assertion being made of the individual(s) in the restrictive clause. 
(7)  a.  Vx (man (x))  1111  3y (woman (y) A love (x, y)) (every man loves a 
woman) 
restrictive clause  1111  nuclear scope 
(CP) ,,[  .... [Sadv  1111  vp[ .... I] 
V,  GEN  1111  3 
So, some authors have assumed that the part of a sentence before  the sentence adverbial 
corresponds to the restrictive clause, the part following the adverbial representing  the 
nuclear scope. The readings in  (8a,b) are thus assumed to follow from a syntactic bi- 
partition corresponding to the bi-partition of the formula of  standard predicate logic. 
(8)  a.  weil ein Feuerwehrmann,  natiirlich immer [vp ti  beREIT ]vp ist: 
generic reading 
because  a  fireman  naturally always  ready  is 
'because a fireman is of course always ready' b.  weil natiirlich immer [vp ein Feuerwehrmann beREIT Ivp ist: 
existential reading 
because naturally always  a  fireman  ready  is 
'because there is of course always a fireman ready' 
Notice, however, that there is no reason why the syntactic structure should correspond 
to a fairly arbitrary partition of a formula of standard predicate logic as the latter was 
not  devised  to  reflect  syntactic  structure  at  all.  Consequently,  a  proper  semantic 
structure giving us a compositional semantic interpretation of sentences like (8a) or (8b) 
will deviate from the fairly simple format of  (7),  as a more detailed representation  in 
categorial grammar would show immediately. Such representations are indeed based on 
the syntactic structure which is taken to be independent of semantic translations like (7) 
and exist prior to them. 
For  this  reason,  I  tried  to  provide  an  independent  motivation  for  the  syntactic bi- 
partition (Lenerz 2001). I assumed that the part preceding the sentence adverbial (thus: 
outside  the  VP)  be  interpreted  as  the  part  of  the  sentence  containing  background 
information  (B-part)  whereas  the  VP  proper  be  the  part  containing  the  focussed 
elements (F-part), i.e. the new information being asserted to hold true of the B-part. 
(7)  b.  (CP)  ,p[  .... [ Sadv  1111  vp[ .... I] 
B-part  1111  F-Part  (background vs. focus) 
b-determined reference  1111  isc-dependent reference 
(isc = immediate sentence constituent) 
This provided a first step towards an explanation of  the scrambling restriction (Id): 
The reference of the elements in  the B-part is plausibly established by background 
information  (b-determined  reference).  Thus,  indefinites  in  the  B-part  should  be 
interpreted as given or known in  their reference, hence as generic. On the other hand, 
the referential expressions in the F-part represent new information. Their reference is, 
however, restricted  by  other  referential  expressions in  the  sentence  as a  whole,  i.e. 
dependent  on  immediate sentence constituents  (isc-dependent reference).  Although  I 
think that this proposal was basically on the right track, it has two shortcomings: First, 
in the light of recent work of Frey (2000) the characterization of the bi-partition into "B- 
part"  and  "F-part"  is  misguided.  Rather,  as  Frey  (2000)  points  out,  the  sentence 
adverbials  (or,  more  precisely,  possibly  the  temporal  adverbials)  marking  the  left 
boundary of the VP proper distinguish between a field containing a (number of) topic 
phrase(s) and the VP proper containing only the cominent (cf. also Rizzi  1997), cf. (12) 
below. 
Second, the restriction of the reference of isc-dependent expressions seems to me far 
more general than I assumed in Lenerz (2001). 
Let us therefore take a closer look at  the referential properties of indefinite NPs. 
Indefinite determiners may be interpreted as choice functions which pick an arbitraly 
referent out of a "reference set" which is characterized by the noun (cf. von Heusinger 
1997). The proper choice of the "reference set"  of a given  NP itself  is dependent on 
(restricted by)  the reference of  expressions  which  c-command  the NP in  D-structure 
(X t  ref.dep. t  Y = Y is referentially  dependent on /referentially  restricted by X); 
hence the  'unmarked order'  of  arguments (SU< IO< DO< V) which does not underlie Scrambling and Reference in German 
any restrictions w.r.1. context / information structure I referential status: SU t  ref.dep 
c  I0  t  ref.dep. c  DO. 
So, in (9) the indefinite NP ein Buch does not refer to any arbitrary element of the set 
of  books  but  is  in  its  reference  restricted  by  at least  the  c-commanding  referential 
expressions der Professor  and dem Studenten. A rough rendering of its interpretation 
may be given as (9b). 
(9)  a.  weil (der) Professor (dem) Studenten gestern  ein  Buch gegeben hat. 
since the professor  the-DAT student yesterday a-ACC book  given  has 
'Since the professor gave the student a book.' 
(9)  b.  ein Buch = [I  an arbitrary element of the set of books which were 
available yesterday to the professor and the student  I] 
Here, 'available' is a rather vague term synonymous with what I dubbed dependent or 
restricted further above. 
Similarly,  the  reference  of  the  indefinite  NP  einem  Studenten  in  (9c)  may  be 
paraphrased as (9d). 
(9)  C.  weil der Professor  gestem  einem  Studenten das  Buch gegeben hat. 
since the professor yesterday a-DAT student the-ACC book  given  has 
'Since the professor gave a student the book.' 
(9)  d.  einem Studenten =  [I an arbitrary element of the set of students which 
were available yesterday to the professor  I] 
The essential idea now is that an indefinite NP looses its referential dependency if it is 
scrambled. Different versions of this idea come to mind, as W. Frey (p. c.) pointed out 
to me: In a strong version, a scrambled NP looses its referential dependency altogether. 
In this view, a scrambled NP has to be interpreted as referring to an arbitrary element of 
the rzon-restricted set of  elements defined by the noun. A weaker version  would hold 
that a scrambled NP looses only the referential dependency which extends from those 
referential  expressions across  which  it  has  been  scrambled.  I have not  been  able to 
decide empirically which version is correct. One observation may be in  favor of  the 
weak  version:  Scrambling  across  an  object  NP  (IOa)  seems  to  result  in  a  weaker 
deviation than scrambling across an object and a subject (lob): 
(10)  a.  ?*wed der Professor ein  Buch  dem  Studenten gegeben hat. 
since the professor  a-ACC book  the-DAT student  given  has 
'since the professor gave a book (to) the student.' 
b.  *wed  ein  Buch  der  Professor dem  Studenten gegeben hat. 
Since  a-ACC book  the professor the-DAT student  given  has 
Similar  grades  of  ungrammaticality  may  also  be  observed  with  scrambling  across 
adverbials. This is an  area requiring some further  investigation.  It follows, however, 
from both versions that the scrambling of an indefinite NP results in a loss of its proper 
referential dependency. Thus, a proper interpretation of  the sentence will no longer be 
possible if the sentence consists of  a specific predication made of  its subject NP. So, in 
the strong version  of  the principle  of  referential dependency, an  interpretation  of  an 
ungrammatical sentence like (lob) will be something like (1 1), certainly a paraphrase of 
an utterance which does not make any sense. (1 1)  *it is  true  for  [I  any arbitrary  book  I]  that  a  specific professor  gave it  to  a 
specific student at a specific time. 
So far,  a  concept  of  the  referential  dependency  of  indefinite  NPs  will  enable us  to 
account  for the  ungrammaticality  of  scrambled  NPs  if  they  are to  be  interpreted  as 
existential. 
In  order  to  account  for  the  generic  interpretation  of  (at  least  some)  scrambled 
indefinites,  we  will  have  to  take  a  closer  look  at  the  topological  and  hierarchical 
structure  of  German  sentences.  As  Rizzi  (1997), Fry  (2000),  Freyffittner  (1998), 
Meinunger (2000) have pointed out, there are several functional projections above VP, 
giving us two or three "fields"  for scrambling. Details of the differences between the 
various proposals aside, it seems necessary to assume at least a number of topic phrases 
(TopP) above VP, constituting a field for scrambling which may also contain at most 
one Focus Phrase (FocP). Also, there is, of course, still the VP proper which is a field 
for  (VP-internal)  scrambling.  Following  Frey  (2000),  one  may  in  addition  assume 
scrambling to a field between the sentence adverbial and a temporal adverbial at the left 
periphery of the VP. 
(12)  (at least) three scrambling- "fields": 
[ CP ?[TO~P*  (FocP) TO~P*  ?[Sad" .  .  . ?[TempAdv vp[(SU) .  . . I]]] 
I shall not  be concerned with  a detailed analysis; for valuable observations and their 
theoretical implications cf. Frey (2000). For my present purpose, it suffices to point out, 
following  Frey  (2000), that  the  Topic Phrases  in  (12)  are  to  be  interpreted  not  as 
'familiarity'-topics  but  as  'aboutness'-topics. This is immediately  made clear by  the 
example (13), taken from Frey (2000). Here, the context given in  (13) provides for an 
'aboutness'-interpretation  of  the NP Otto. The following sentence (l3a) complies with 
this, as Otto is in an ('aboutness')-topic position. (13b) is not a proper successor for (13) 
since Otto in (13b) is not an 'aboutness'-topic. 
(13)  Ich erzahl dir ma1 was von Otto. ,Well, I'll tell you something about Otto.' 
a.  Nachstes Jahr wird Otto wahrscheinlich seine Kollegin  heiraten. 
next  year will  Otto probably  his  colleag~~elfem.)  marry 
'Next Year. Otto will probably marry his colleague.' 
# Nachstes Jahr wird wahrscheinlich Otto seine Kollegin  heiraten. 
next  year will  probably  Otto  his  colleague marry 
From  the  assumption  that  we  are  dealing  with  'aboutness'-topics,  it  follows 
immediately  that  non-referring  expressions  like  keiner  ('nobody'),  not  being 
'aboutness'-topics, cannot appear in this position. 
If  this is basically correct, as I assume, the possibility of a generic interpretation of 
NPs  which  have been  scrambled  to a  topic-position  follows:  If  an  indefinite  NP  is 
scrambled to a topic-position, it becomes an 'aboutness'-topic, the rest of the sentence 
being a comment on this topic. In other words, a topic-comment structure establishes a 
kind of  secondary prediction. The comment itself, containing the primary predication 
(subject-predicate, possibly represented inside the VP) has to make sense w.r.t. the topic 
it is about. Thus, a scrambled generic NP requires, of course, a generic comment, as in 
(14a). Scrambling and Reference in German 
(14)  a.  weil  naturlich  oft  mit  ihren Kindern spielen. (GEN) 
since fathers naturally ofen  with their children play 
'Since fathers do of course often play with their children.' 
If  this analysis is correct it does not follow however that a NP which is scrambled to a 
topic-position  must be interpreted as generic. Thus, given  a proper specific comment, 
the scrambled NP should also be interpretable with  a specific existential reference, as 
(14b), I believe, shows. 
(14)  b.  weil  natiirlich auch gestern mit ihren Kindern spielten. (3, specific) 
Since fathers naturally also yesterday with their children played 
'Since also yesterday fathers played with their children.' 
Notice that in my present analysis this is predicted whereas with a bi-partition analysis 
along the lines of (7a) a generic reading is stipulated, and an existential reading for a 
scrambled NP is  ruled  out. The same holds for my  previous  analysis  (7b) since the 
reference  of  a scrambled NP in  the B-part of  the sentence (referring  to  background 
knowledge) has to be taken to be established, hence an existential reading should not be 
possible. I conclude. thus, that the restriction on the scrambling of indefinites as given 
above is wrong. The correct restriction seems to be (15): 
(15)  a.  don't scramble indefinites inside the VP (=this follows from referential 
dependency) 
b.  indefinites which are scrambled to the topic-position are only allowed if 
they  can  be  interpreted  as  referentially  independent  from  referential 
expressions which they c-command in the scrambling position. 
Both  parts  of  this  condition follow  from  a  proper  theory  of  referential  dependency 
together with a proper theory of topic-comment-structure and its interpretation. Details 
of both theories will of course have to be worked out. 
In  the  rest  of  this  paper,  I  will  discuss  some  ramifications  and  some  possible 
consequences of a theory of referential dependency. 
As pointed out above, scrambling across a subject is ungrammatical  in  most cases, 
cf. (16). 
(16)  *wed Eisbaren  naturlich  Paul  gestern  fotografierte. 
Since polar bears(ACC)  naturally Paul yesterday  took-pictures-of 
This statement has to be relativized, however, given examples like (17). 
(17)  weil  Eisbaren  naturlich  alle mogen / niemand mag. (GEN) 
Since polar bears(ACC)  naturally all  like  /nobody  likes 
'Since, naturally, everybody 1 nobody likes polar bears.' 
Here a subject NP with a universal quantifier (alle 'everybody') or a negated existential 
quantifier  (niemand , 'nobody')  does  not  block  scrambling  of  the  indefinite  NP 
Eisbaren ('polar bears').  It  cannot  be  the  generic quality  of  the  subject NP  as such which allows for scrambling, as (18) shows, where the generic indefinite NP Eisbiiren 
('polar  bears')  has  been  scrambled  across the  generic  subject  NP  ein  Eskimo  ('an 
Eskimo'). 
(18)  *wed Eisbaren naturlich ein Eskimo gerne jagt. 
since polar bears naturally an Eskimo gladly hunts 
'since an Eskimo likes to hunt polar bears.' 
The facts are far from clear especially as one tends to utter sentences like (17) or (18) 
with a bridge accent, stressing the scrambled NP (Eisbaren) as well as the subject NP 
(alle,  keiner,  ein  Eskimo).  This  specific  intonation  pattern  seems  to  'rescue'  the 
sentences. (For details of a proper analysis of bridge accent structures cf. Biiring 1997, 
among others). With  normal  sentence intonation,  however,  (18)  seems to  me  to  be 
ungrammatical.  What would follow along the lines of explanation which I suggested is 
the following: 
While (17)  is  a  possible  topic-comment  structure,  (18)  is  not. In  (17), a kind  of 
'secondary  predication'  is  made  of  polar  bears  in  general:  Everybodylnobody  likes 
them.  In  (18)  however, the comment  on  the topic  phrase  Eisbaren  does  not  seem 
reasonable: It does not make much sense to assert of polar bears that in general  it is true 
that  any  (generic)  Eskimo  has  the  property  of  liking  to  hunt  them.  So, again,  an 
explanation for the constraint to scramble across referentially restricted subjects (as in 
(18), as opposed to (17) with subject NPs which are not restricted referentially) relies on 
a  proper  theory  of  referential  dependency  and  a  proper  theory  of  topic-comment 
structure and its interpretation. 
Another  observation  concerns  the  order  of  arguments  in  the  topic  field.  As 
Meinunger  (2000)  points  out, Rizzi's  (1997) proposal  of  a  series  of  topic  phrases 
wedged in between the functional projections CP on  the left and possibly IP or some 
part of it on the right, cf. (12), has to be revised: Meinunger analyzes the Topic Phrases 
as  Agreement  Phrases. Their  unmarked  hierarchical  order seems to  be  the  same as 
inside the VP, as (lYa,b,c) show. 
(19)  a.  weil Paul  seiner  Freundin  Schmuck  natiirlich  gerne  schenkt. 
since Paul his-DAT girlfriend jewelleyr(ACC) naturally gladly donates 
'Since Paul likes to give his girl friend jewellery' 
b.  *weil Paul Schmuck  seiner  Freundin  natiirlich  gerne  schenkt 
since Paul  jewellety(ACC) his-DATgirl-friend  naturally gladly donates 
c.  *weil Schmuck  Paul seiner  Freundin  naturlich  gerne  schenkt. 
Since  jewellery(ACC) Paul his-DAT girlfriend  naturally gladly donates 
All  the  arguments  in  these  sentences  are  scrambled  across  the  sentence  adverbial 
natiirlich  ('naturally'),  thus  above  the VP-projection.  If  their  ordering  violates  the 
unmarked order SV>IO>DO, as in (19b,c), the sentence is ungrammatical. If this is true, 
it indicates strongly that referential dependency does not only apply inside the VP but 
inside  the  whole  'middle  field'  of  German  sentences,  i.e.  to  the  whole  part  of  the 
sentence below the CP. 
The initial field, however, does not seem to participate in  the overall relationship of 
c-commanding referential  dependency.  Thus, a  NP  in  SpecCP retains its  referential 
dependency from its original position. Hence, movement to SpecCP does not have to 
obey the restrictions  which  hold  for scrambling; consequently,  any NP  (or any other Scrambling and Reference in German 
maximal projection) may be placed in the initial field no matter where its source in the 
base structure is. This can be shown quite clearly if  we consider possessive phrases, a 
good  example  of  referential  dependency.  A  possessive  pronoun  may  refer  to  a  c- 
commanding NP only in the unmarked order (20a): 
(20)  a.  Gestern  hat  tatsachlich (der)  Peter, seinen ,  Bruder gelobt. 
yesterday has actually  (the-NOM) Peter,  his,  -ACC  brother praised 
'Yesterday, Peter actually praised his brother.' 
b.  * Gestern  hat  tatsachlich seinen ,  Bruder  (der)  Peter, gelobt. 
yesterday has actually  his,  -ACC brother  the-NOM Peter prarsed 
c.  *Gestern  hat seinen ,  Bruder  tatsachlich der  Peter, gelobt. 
Yesterday has his,  -ACC  brother actually  the-NOM Peter, praised 
d.  Seinen ,  Bruder  hat (der)  Peter, gestern  gelobt. 
His ,-ACC  brother has the-NOM Peter, yesterday praised 
If  the possessive phrase is scrambled, as in  (20b,c), it looses its co-reference with a NP 
across which it has been scrambled. If, however, the possessive phrase is moved to the 
initial position  as in  (20d), it retains the possibility of co-reference with the subject NP 
across which it has been moved. (Non-co-referential readings of the possessive pronoun 
are possible throughout since they do not show the kind of (co)-referential dependency 
requiring the corresponding c-command relations.) 
A closer look reveals, however, that the conditions are a little more complicated if  we 
consider the interaction with adverbials. If  my judgement  is correct, then movement of 
an object NP to the sentence initial position seems only possible if the subject has been 
scrambled from its VP-internal position, as the examples in (21a-c) show. 
(21)  a.  Eisbaren  hat  Paul natiirlich  immer geliebt. 
polar bears(ACC) has Paul naturally always loved 
'Polar bears, Paul always loved them' 
b.  Eisbaren  hat natiirlich  Paul  immer  geliebt. 
polar bears(ACC)  has naturally Paul  always loved 
c.  *Eisbaren  hat  natiirlich  immer  Paul  geliebt. 
polar bears(ACC)  has naturally always  Paul loved 
The case is different if the subject is moved to SpecCP as in (22). In this case the object 
Eisbaren 'polar bears'  may either remain inside the VP (22a) or be scrambled to a topic 
position (22b). 
(22)  b.  Paul hat natiirlich  immer  Eisbaren  geliebt. 
Paul has naturally always polar bears (ACC)  loved 
a.  Paul hat  EisbLen  natiirlich  immer geliebt. 
Paul has polar bears(ACC) naturally always loved 
'Paul has of course always loved polar bears.' 
Still, both  sentences  seem to have a  slightly different  interpretation.  What comes to 
mind in the present discussion is the idea that here, too, referential dependency plays a 
role.  For the  cases  in  (21), my explanation  would  be  as  follows:  Let  us  assume  a 
referential dependency between the subject and the temporal  adverbial. If  the definite subject Paul stays in its base position inside the VP, as in (21a), the temporal adverbial 
immer  ('always')  is  not  restricted  referentially.  Thus,  (21a)  would  have  the 
interpretation that for  all times in the universe it be true that the specific individual Paul 
loves polar  bears, clearly not a reasonable  assertion, given that individuals like Paul 
only live for a specific period  of  time.  In  (21b), however, the temporal  adverbial is 
referentially dependent from the scrambled subject which c-commands it from its topic 
position. In this case, immer ('always') may only refer to all times available to Paul, as 
it were, giving the intended interpretation. Similar considerations will apply to the slight 
difference in meaning between (22a) and (22b). Whatever the details of the analysis will 
turn out to be, what (21) and (22) show us is that there exists some paradoxical kind of 
interaction between scrambling and movement to SpecCP which has to be investigated 
in more detail: A temporal adverbial seems to be referentially dependent from a subject 
in  SpecCP. This looks as if  movement to  SpecCP presupposes  scrambling to a topic 
position in which the required referential dependency is established. On the other hand, 
an object in SpecCP seems to retain its referential dependency from its base position. 
As regards possessive phrases, they also show that  it  is necessary to assume such an 
interaction between scrambling and movement to the initial position. As (23a) shows, 
scrambling of  the definite I0  dein Otto ('the-DAT Otto') to a topic position enables us 
to  interpret  the  subject  NP  sein  Vater  ('his  father')  with  a  co-referent  possessive 
pronoun, as indicated by the indices. This is not possible for (23b). Here, the subject is 
scrambled to a topic position  in which its possessive pronoun is not c-commanded by 
the  co-referential  NP  Otto, hence  cannot  be  interpreted  as  referentially  dependent. 
(Again, as in (20), non-co-referential readings are possible.) 
(23)  a.  Allerdings wird dem Ottoi wahrscheinlich sein, Vater t das Auto 
ausleihen. 
Indeed  will  the-DAT Ottoj probably  hisj  father  the car  lend 
'Indeed, Otto's father will probably lend him the car.' 
b.  *Allerdings wird seini Vater wahrscheinlich t dem Ottoi das Auto 
ausleihen. 
Indeed  will  hisi  father probably  the-DAT-Otto;  the cur  lend. 
(24)  a.  Sein; Vater  wird dem  Ottoi  wahrscheinlich  t  das Auto ausleihen. 
Hisi  father will the-DAT Ottoi probably  the car  lend 
'Probably, Otto's father will lend him the car.' 
b.  *Seini  Vater  wird wahrscheinlich  t  dem  Ottoi das Auto ausleihen. 
His;  father  will probably  the-DAT Otto; the car  lend 
Fronting of  the possessive  phrase in  (24a) is possible with  the co-referential reading. 
Given  the  scenario I  assumed  so far, this  is  explained  if  we  assume the  structure 
indicated  by  the  trace  in  the  VP-internal  subject  position,  i.e.  if  we  assume  an 
underlying  structure with  the  I0 scrambled  to  a  topic  position.  (24b),  however,  is 
ungrammatical with a co-referential reading. This would be explained if  we assume an 
underlying structure in which the fronted phrase originates in  the position  indicated by 
the trace. 
Many puzzles remain. What the preceding discussion of  but a few cases of  referential 
dependency, however, shows, to my mind, is that the area of application of the concept Scrambling and Reference in German 
of  referential  dependency  is  quite  diversified  and  the  crucial  facts  are  as  yet  not 
understood  very well  at all. Furthermore, it seems to me, the very  general concept of 
referential dependency, if  correct, may also be relied upon to derive the property and 
position of personal pronouns and other referential expressions. Hence, binding theory 
and a proper theory of the interaction of quantifiers may eventually turn out to follow 
from a general theory of referential dependency yet to be elaborated. 
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